This paper studies the relationship between sovereign debt default and annual GDP growth taking into account the depth of a debt restructuring and distinguishing between commercial and o¢ cial sovereign debt restructurings. Analyzing 73 default episodes in 117 countries over the period 1975-2013, I …nd that defaults are correlated with contraction of short-term output growth. Most importantly, controlling for the severity of the default, I am able to detect a more lasting and negative link between default and growth. While higher private haircuts imply a negative stigma which is associated to lower growth over a longer period, higher amount of o¢ cial restructuring may have some costs in the short-run, but are associated to an increase in growth in the long run. Adopting an alternative speci…cation, in which the dependent variable is a country's credit rating, I …nd very similar results for private haircuts and o¢ cial restructurings. They are both associated to lower ratings up to seven years after the default. To the extent that credit ratings is a good proxy for borrowing costs, positive growth prospects for o¢ cial defaulters seem not to be in ‡uenced by a lower reputation in the credit markets.
Introduction
Sovereign defaults and debt restructuring are not costless as a sovereign's unilateral decisions to stop servicing its debt implies important economic costs. At least this is what the sovereign debt literature has commonly assumed as a government's main incentive to honor its debt obligations. In sovereign debt theory defaults maybe costly due to direct punishment (mainly trade sanctions), capital market exclusion or higher cost of borrowing (the so called reputational e¤ect) or mainly domestic costs, which in turn depend on negative spillovers on corporate access to foreign credit, investments and trade (Bulow and 2 Only very recently, Cruces and Trebesch (2013a) came to di¤erent conclusions, which are more in line with the e¤ects of a default according to the theory. More speci…cally, by including in their analysis a measure of investors'losses (or "haircuts"), they show that restructuring involving higher haircuts are associated with signi…cantly higher subsequent bond yield spreads and longer periods of capital market exclusion (that is credit markets do not seem to "forgive and forget," as in Bulow and Rogo¤ 1989b) . Such di¤erent result with respect to the previous literature is remarkable and it is attributed to a more precise measurement of a country's repayment record. Therefore, their analysis does suggest that it is crucial to consider the magnitude of a default and not only its occurrence.
As the direct link between debt default and economic growth is concerned, a strong but short-lived negative contemporaneous e¤ect on GDP growth is found by Sturzenegger (2004) and later con…rmed by Borensztein and Panizza (2009) and De Paoli et al. (2006) and (2009) . 3 In all these cases, however, the e¤ects speci…cally associated with a default (on the top of those related to the crisis itself) are quite di¢ cult to identify. Therefore, while there is evidence that sovereign debt defaults are negatively correlated with economic growth, there is no study …nding a causal relationship going from default to growth.
In this paper I focus on the relationship between annual GDP growth and both private haircut and o¢ cial debt restructuring applying a similar methodology to Cruces and Trebesch (2013a) to the analysis of the relationship between debt default and economic growth. 4 Speci…cally, I take the creditors' losses as proxy of the severity of the default episode and I verify if higher private haircuts (or higher o¢ cial restructurings) are correlated with a signi…cant contraction of (annual) economic growth over a period of ten years. While the overall evidence indicates that default episodes are negatively correlated with growth, in this literature the decision of a default has been modelled as a binary decision ignoring the large variation in restructuring outcomes. 5 Debt restructuring could a¤ect growth in at least two alternative ways. Higher private haircuts (or o¢ cial restructurings) may have negative e¤ects on growth, as the adverse spillovers of a default are likely to be more severe in hard defaults (i.e., involving higher haircuts/restructurings) as compared to soft defaults (see Trebesch and Zebel 2014) . Alternatively, there is the channel of debt relief operating in the opposite direction. Since higher haircuts/restructurings reduce the level of government's debt more substantially, such debt reduction might allow countries to exit a debt overhang improving in this way growth prospects, as described by Krugman (1988) . The overall impact of a debt restructuring on growth is then theoretically ambiguous and remains an empirical question.
Despite the policy relevance of this issue, little is known about the characteristics and the economic relevance of debt restructuring. 6 I contribute towards …lling this gap by studying the relationship between debt default and annual GDP growth over a ten-year period, by taking into account the depth of a debt restructuring. 7 Moreover, I do distinguish between commercial and o¢ cial restructurings. In fact, given the di¤erent characteristics of these two types of defaulters (most importantly their di¤erent ability to access the credit market), I expect that the above mentioned trade-o¤ between the reputational and the "debt-relief e¤ect" of a debt restructuring may act di¤erently for sovereign defaulters on private or o¢ cial debt. 8 To the best of my knowledge, it is the …rst time in this literature that the link between GDP growth and debt restructuring is investigated over such a (relatively) long time period, and that the distinction between private and o¢ cial restructuring is taken into account.
Analyzing 73 default episodes in 117 countries over the period 1975-2013, I …nd that defaults are correlated with contraction of short-term output growth. Moreover, controlling for the severity of the default, I am able to detect a more lasting and negative link between debt default and growth. For private haircuts, occurrence and magnitude goes into opposite direction and high haircuts seem to imply a negative stigma lowering growth over a longer period. Alternatively, higher amount of o¢ cial restructuring may have some costs in the short-run, but they do have some positive e¤ects over the long run, as the debt relief e¤ect of high restructurings seems to improve recovery. In this case, no stigma is associated to the size of the restructuring, indeed defaulters seem to bene…t from the debt relief e¤ect of high restructurings (as in Arslanalp and Henry, 2005) , which somehow soften the negative consequences of an o¢ cial default.
Finally, in an alternative speci…cation, in which the dependent variable is a country's credit 6 More recently, however, some attention has been devoted to the speci…c analysis of debt renegotiations. Among others, Benjamin and Wright 2009, Asonuma and Trebesch (2015) , Trebesch and Zebel (2014) and Reinhart and Trebesch (2015) have been speci…cally focusing on debt crisis resolution and renegotiation. 7 Trebesch and Zabel (2014) , by distinguishing between hard defaults (more confrontational) and soft defaults (adopting a consensual crisis resolutions), show that hard defaults are associated with a much steeper drop in output as compared to soft defaults. Surprisingly, however, after …ve years, neither high haircuts nor debtor coerciveness are associated with lower growth. Reinhart and Trebesch (2015) , focusing only on the amount of debt relief achieved in the samples 1920-1939 and 1978-2010 …nd that while softer forms of debt relief, (e.g. maturity extensions) are not generally followed by higher economic growth, only debt write-o¤s are able to improve the economic situation of debtor countries. 8 For example, private defaulters would be expected, on average, to be more likely to repay, as compared to o¢ cial defaulters. As a consequence, when they default, the negative stigma of a higher haircut is likely to outweigh the bene…ts of a greater "debt-relief e¤ect". rating, I investigate whether one of the channels explaining the link between restructuring and growth may work through the credit market (borrowing conditions highly correlate with sovereign ratings). To my knowledge, it is the …rst time that both the occurrence and the magnitude of a restructuring are considered as possible determinants of a country's credit ratings.
In the case of private haircuts, my results con…rm that higher haircuts are associated to lower ratings up to …ve years after the default (as well as higher haircuts negatively correlates with growth over a long period). The same holds, however, in the case of o¢ cial restructurings, for which higher restructurings are associated to lower ratings up to seven years after the default. Therefore, in the case of credit ratings, I do not …nd anymore a systematic di¤erence between sovereign defaulters on private debt with respect to defaulters on o¢ cial debt. To the extent that credit ratings is a good proxy for borrowing costs, this evidence implies that growth prospects for o¢ cial defaulters are not a¤ected by a lower reputation in the credit markets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical model and the data while the results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes some robustness checks while section 5 presents the results of an alternative speci…cation in which the dependent variable is a country's credit rating. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
Data and empirical model
In this section, I analyze the e¤ects of a debt default on economic growth by controlling for the severity of the default episode. For this reason I include both a measure of private creditors' losses (the so called private haircuts) and a measure of o¢ cial restructurings (Paris Club debt restructurings) as proxies for the magnitude of both private and o¢ cial defaults. 5 
Default coding and sample composition
Our analysis spans the years between 1975 and 2013 and includes 117 developing and emerging market economies. 9 I have selected this sample as follows. First, I excluded from the sample small countries with a population of less than 1 million (as measured at the end of the sample period in 2013) and all advanced economies, in order to make the sample as homogeneous as possible. Moreover, I dropped countries whose debt restructurings took place in the context of wars and state dissolution, such as Iraq, and successor states of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e., Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia). The resulting set of 117 countries includes 73 defaulting countries, which experienced at least one debt crisis during the sample period as well as 44 non-defaulters.
Among defaulters, 51 countries had both private haircuts and o¢ cial debt restructurings, 18 countries had only o¢ cial debt restructurings (through the Paris Club) while only 4 countries had only private haircuts. 10 Table A1 in the Appendix shows all countries and years, including a list of debt crisis episodes studied here. Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of haircuts by percentage size.
I relied on the original dataset by Cruces and Trebesch (2013b) for the data on restructurings with foreign banks and bondholders (commercial creditors). 12 More speci…cally, the database of investor losses built by Cruces and Trebesch (2013b) is based on the 9 More speci…cally, following the 2013 World Bank Country classi…cation, I have included low, middle income and high income (non OECD) countries. 10 51 countries of the sample had instead both their commercial and o¢ cial debt restructured. 11 In the late 1980s (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , Brady deals addressed commercial bank lending to sovereign debtors (mostly middle-income countries) involving a combination of an IMF agreement and debt-service reduction and rescheduling from commercial banks. Brady deals, which eventually put an end to the 1980s debt crisis for 17 debtor countries, involved an average haircut of 45 percent (Cruces and Trebesch 2013 13 Cruces and Trebesch then de…ne haircuts as: 14 While prior literature used a constant average rate for each restructuring, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer set-up a restructuring-speci…c discount rate, r i t , dataset (not country-speci…c), which is computed by the speci…c country situation and by the level of credit risk premium at that time. 15 This dataset was last updated in November 2012.
cent, thus resulting much more frequent but much lower that the average private haircut. Figure 2 shows the frequency distribution of o¢ cial restructuring by percentage size. 
Method
In this subsection, I analyze the relationship between private and o¢ cial restructuring and annual per capita GDP growth over the 1975-2013 period. I obtain an unbalanced panel which comprises a maximum of 117 developing countries, depending on the control variables I include. I use a …xed-e¤ects GLS estimator in order to correct for heteroskedasticity across countries and obtain e¢ cient estimates. 18 The results are qualitatively unchanged 16 The average size is only 3.5 percentage points higher during the intermediate subperiod with respect to the initial one. 17 Such number is, however, almost twice as much the number of low income countries experiencing a private haircut. 18 A groupwise likelihood ratio heteroskedasticity test, performed on the residuals of the baseline model estimated by OLS, led to a rejection of the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity across groups (countries) when I correct for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, I estimate the model using robust OLS or OLS with standard errors clustered at the country level.
Speci…cally I test:
j = +1; 1; :::::; 10 (1) where y it represents per capita growth in country i at period t, R it+j is the amount restructured (private or o¢ cial) associated to the default of the year t in country i, D it+j is an indicator variable equal to one when country i; in year t; has …nalized its last restructuring; and X is a vector containing my control variables.
I then generated twelve variables denoting the anticipated default, current default and up to ten lags of each default episode; and twelve more variables denoting the haircut (and the o¢ cial restructuring) at t + 1, t and up to ten years following the sovereign debt restructuring. Finally, i and t denote country and time dummies, respectively, which allow us to control for both countries unobservable and time invariant variation and common trends. 19 The advantage of estimating equation (1) for all regressions. 19 In this way I can also accounts for global factors that might have in ‡uenced the simultaneous dating choice of debt restructuring events (e.g., Baker or Brady plan in the two periods, 1985-88, and, 1989-94, respectively). 9 3 Empirical results
Private haircuts
The results of the model of equation (1) are presented in table 2. In columns 1-3, I
report only the coe¢ cients of the private haircut dummy, the private haircut and of both variables together, in the year of the restructuring, one year before and one year after the restructuring episode without any control variables. 20 Column 4 reports the same speci…cation of column 3 including control variables. In columns 5-8, I progressively add the coe¢ cients of both the haircut dummies and size (from three to up to ten years after the default) to the speci…cation of column 4. While all these results are reported for comparison, I largely base the discussion on the fully speci…ed model of column 8.
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As can be seen, most of the control variables have the expected sign. Growth rates significantly increases with higher investment and civil liberties, while it decreases with higher population growth, higher public expenditure and after the occurrence of a banking crisis.
The coe¢ cients of terms of trade, population (in log) and openness are not signi…cant. 22 As our variables of interests are concerned, in column 8, I …nd that the relationship between growth and the private haircut dummy has generally the opposite sign with respect to that between growth and the haircut size. If I look at the short-term link between growth and private haircut, one year after the default, the coe¢ cient of the haircut dummy is positive and signi…cant at the …ve-percent level (growth increases by almost 1.9 percent at time), while an increase of one standard deviation in the size of the haircut is associated with a decrease in growth by about 0.3 percent. Current levels of both the haircut dummy and its size seem not to be signi…cantly related to growth.
Over a longer period, correlation between the haircut dummy and growth remains positive (but not always signi…cant) up to the ninth year after the default episode while, over the same period, the relationship between private haircut and growth is always negative (but not always signi…cant). More speci…cally, the coe¢ cient of the haircut dummy is positive 20 We should be aware that the results of columns 1 and 2 do not allow di¤erentiating between the growth variation associated with a restructuring and that associated with the size of the haircut. In particular equation 2 is problematic as it only includes the interacted variable (R it+j ) but not the constitutive term (D it+j ) (Cruces and Trebesch 2013). 21 The best way to interpret the …ndings of table 2 is to consider the expected variation in growth as conditional on the haircut size, that is j R it j + j :
22 These results are indeed quite similar to those obtained by Levy Yeyati and Panizza (2011). and signi…cant, at the one-percent level, nine years after the default (growth increases by about 1.8 percent at time). On the other hand, an increase of one standard deviation in the size of the haircut nine is associated with a decrease in growth by about 0.25 percent.
Clearly, this is an economically relevant magnitude. In …gure 3, I summarize the results with two graphs that track the evolution over time of the size, sign and signi…cance of the coe¢ cients of both the haircut dummy and size.
To sum up, while the occurrence of a private haircut is positively associated to economic growth, its actual size, which proxies the magnitude of the default episode, seem to represent a negative stigma for the countries involved. Private haircuts are associated to some negative (reputational) costs which lower growth over a long period somehow delaying recovery.
Our results are indeed similar to those of Cruces and Trebesch (2013a). I should emphasize, however, that the results in this section should be taken cautiously.
In particular, they do not imply that imposing high haircuts have a long-lasting e¤ects on growth. As I have explained, identi…cation is di¢ cult and there are competing channels, which are hard to disentangle in the data at hand. Moreover, it is possible that the timing of the restructuring is endogenous, which in turn may bias the haircut coe¢ cient. 
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O¢ cial Restructurings
The results for o¢ cial restructurings are presented in table 3. Columns 1-3 of table 3 report only the coe¢ cients of the o¢ cial restructuring dummy, the o¢ cial restructuring size and of both variables together in the year of the default, one year before and after the default episode, respectively, without any control variables. Column 4 reports the same speci…cation of column 3 including control variables. In columns 5-8, I progressively add, to the speci…cation of column 4, the coe¢ cients of both the o¢ cial restructuring dummy and size from up to three to up to ten years after the default. As above, I largely base our discussion on the fully speci…ed model of column 8.
Most of our control variables have the expected impact on growth. As our variables of interest are concerned, looking at column 8 of table 3, I …nd that the evidence of a correlation between growth and the simple event of an o¢ cial restructuring becomes actually much weaker than in the case of a private haircut. The only coe¢ cient which is signi…cant, at …ve-percent level, and with a negative sign, is that of the anticipated event of an o¢ cial restructuring, which is correlated with a growth contraction of about one percent. As the size of the restructuring is concerned, the anticipation of an o¢ cial restructuring positively correlates with growth (in particular an increase of one standard deviation in the amount of o¢ cial restructuring increases growth by about 0.55 percent).
Once the default actually materializes, however, the size of the restructuring becomes correlated with a growth contraction 24 Over a longer period, i.e., since four up to ten years after the restructuring episode, I
…nd evidence of a positive correlation between growth and the amount of the o¢ cial debt restructured. In particular, eight years after the default an increase of one standard deviation in the amount of o¢ cial restructuring increases growth by about 0.22 percent.
25 Figure 4 shows more clearly the evolution over time of the size, sign and signi…cance of the coe¢ cients of o¢ cial restructuring dummy and size.
FIGURES 4 HERE
In summary, the trade-o¤ concerning the amount of a sovereign debt restructuring is associated to opposite outcomes for private and o¢ cial defaulters. Higher amount of o¢ cial restructuring may have some (social and political costs) in the short-run, but eventually they imply some positive e¤ects over the long term, as the debt relief e¤ect of high restructurings seems to improves recovery by freeing up new resources. As before, controlling for the severity of the default through the amount of o¢ cial restructurings, allows me to detect a more lasting (and negative) link between debt default and growth which is however mitigated by the size of the restructuring. No stigma is now associated to the size of the restructuring, indeed o¢ cial defaulters seem to bene…t from the debt relief e¤ect of high restructurings (as in Arslanalp and Henry, 2005) , which possibly mitigate the negative consequences of an o¢ cial default. 
Robustness checks
This section aims to test the robustness of our main model of equation (1). More specifically, I try to control for the presence of (i) autocorrelated standard errors (ii) omitted variable bias, as common shocks could a¤ect both output and haircuts, and (iii) reverse causality, since changes in output can potentially explain the type of default. All these results are shown in table 4.
Autocorrelated standard errors. I address concerns of serially correlated errors by both including lagged growth in my speci…cation and by estimating the model correcting for AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across countries. In a dynamic panel with country …xed e¤ects the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the country-speci…c component of the error term and, thus, the OLS …xed-e¤ects estimator produces biased estimates. However, Nickell (1981) shows that, in the AR(1) case, the bias declines as the time series dimension of the panel, T , increases. Judson and Owen (1999) testing the performance of the …xed-e¤ects estimator on panels with typical macroeconomic dimensions …nd that the …xed-e¤ects estimator performs well when T = 30. As in our sample T = 39, I expect any bias introduced by the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable to be very small. I then include growth at time (t 1), in both columns one and four of table 4 and, as can be seen, both sign and signi…cance of the restructuring variables remain overall the same. The same holds when I correct for AR (1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across countries
Additional controls. The results could still be biased due to the omission of time-varying country-speci…c variables correlated with both growth and the government payment behavior and growth, despite controlling for time and country …xed e¤ects and standard macro controls. More speci…cally, following Trebesch and Zebel (2014), I include political risk (as debtor payment attitude may be a¤ected by political crises) and control for the occurrence of currency crises (as well as the occurrence of banking crises). 26 Thus, I add the ICRG political risk indicator as well as a dummy for changes in the executive (taken from the Database of Political Institutions, DPI). Moreover, I also include in ‡ation and the debt to GDP ratio, both taken form the World Development Indicators (WDI). 27 In columns three and eight of table 4 I have then included additional controls, which, however, are available only for a reduced sample. As the number of observations drops dramatically (by almost half) these results are hardly comparable as changes in the coe¢ cients of the interest variables might be due to changes in sample size rather than to their di¤erent e¤ect. Nevertheless, the results are overall similar to those of previous speci…cations.
Reverse causality. Reverse causality can indeed be one of the main objection to comment our result. Therefore, I test the in ‡uence of lagged growth on our explanatory variables. More speci…cally, in columns 1-3 of table 5 I test the in ‡uence of lagged growth on the current level of private haircut, while in columns 4-6 I test the in ‡uence of lagged growth on the level of o¢ cial restructuring. In both speci…cations I do not …nd any evidence that lagged growth is a good predictor for either private haircut or o¢ cial restructuring.
Taken together, I …nd no evidence for reverse causality and no evidence for a confounder driving our main results. Nevertheless, I should be interpret our result with caution as I cannot detect any causal e¤ect but only strong conditional correlations. 
Credit ratings
In this section I investigate whether one of the channels explaining the link between restructuring and growth may work through the capital market. More speci…cally, adopting an alternative speci…cation in which the dependent variable is a country's credit rating, should allow me to investigate whether variations in the borrowing costs (represented by variation in the credit ratings) could, at least partially, explain corresponding variations in GDP growth.
Studies that measured the impact of default on borrowing costs have focused on both direct and indirect measures, the main indirect measure being a country's credit rating. This is a relevant measure because credit ratings tend to be highly correlated with borrowing costs. Cantor and Packer (1996) were among the …rst to focus on the relationship between default history and credit ratings. Collecting data for about 50 countries in 1995, they …nd that a dummy variable equal to one for countries that defaulted after 1970 is associated with a signi…cant drop in a country's credit rating. Reinhart et al. (2003) …nd that a history of default is associated with lower ratings assigned by the Institutional Investor publication. Table A4 .
Method
I analyze the relationship between private haircut and o¢ cial restructuring and credit rating over the 1990-2013 period. I obtain an unbalanced panel which comprises a maximum of 70 developing countries, depending on the control variables I include. I use a …xed-e¤ects GLS estimator in order to correct for heteroskedasticity across countries and obtain e¢ cient estimates. 31 Generalized least squares treat the dependent variable as
cardinal. This implies that the di¤erence between an "AA" and an "AA+" rating, for example, is the same as between "BB" and "BB+." Nonetheless, as I will show in the appendix that results are robust to using an ordered probit model for the discrete 21-step rating at the end of each year. 32 More speci…cally, I test:
where c it represents credit rating (credit index) in country i at period t, R it+j is the amount restructured (private or o¢ cial) associated to the default of the year t in country i, D it+j is an indicator variable equal to one when country i; in year t; has …nalized its last restructuring; and Z is a vector containing my control variables. Finally, i and t denote 30 Results are however qualitatively unchanged and they available on request. 31 I have tested for the normality of the pooled credit rating by Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's and the hypothesis that it is normally distributed could not be rejected at conventional levels. 32 I can report only the direction of the e¤ect and the signi…cance levels as marginal e¤ects are conditional on each respective rating level. country and time dummies, respectively, which allow us to control for both countries unobservable and time invariant variation and common trends.
Since the number of observations is now much lower, following Cruces and Trebesch (2013a), I generated only seven variables denoting the anticipated restructuring dummy, current restructuring dummy and up to seven lags of each restructuring episode; and seven more variables denoting the haircut (and the o¢ cial restructuring) at t + 1, t and up to seven years following the sovereign debt restructuring. As above, the advantage of estimating equation (2) is that it allows me to disentangle the "occurrence" versus "magnitude" e¤ect of a private (or o¢ cial) restructuring.
As the control variables are concerned I also rely on the speci…cation by Cruces and Trebesch (2013a). 33 As they do, to capture the sovereign's domestic economic performance, I included, public debt to GDP, the general government net lending/borrowing, per capita GDP, GDP real growth, total population (in log), reserves to imports, in ‡ation rate (based on consumer prices), current account, the ICRG political risk indicator and the number of years the chief executive has been in o¢ ce.
34 Table A2 in the Appendix provides a detailed description of each control variable and its source while table A3 shows some summary statistics.
Haircut
The results of the model of equation (2) are presented in table 6. In columns 1-2, I report only the coe¢ cients of the private haircut dummy, the haircut and of both variables together, in the year of the restructuring, one year before and one year after the default episode, without, and including control variables. In columns 3-4, I progressively add the coe¢ cients of both the haircut dummies and size (from three up to six and seven years after the default) to the speci…cation of column 2. While all these results are reported for comparison, I largely base the discussion on the fully speci…ed model of column 4.
35 33 In their paper the dependent variable were bond yield spreads and periods of capital market exclusion. 34 As the variable "general government net lending/borrowing" reduces substantially the sample size I present the results excluding it. The results, which are available on request, are qualitatively unchanged when we include this control. 35 In table A5 I also report the results of the same speci…cation when using ordered probit instead of GLS. The statistic for computing an ordered probit (or logit) model with …xed e¤ects does not provide consistent estimates, thus in this case I am able to estimate only a random-e¤ect model. In Table A5 the results are qualitatively unchanged. Similar results (available upon request) are also obtained when using ordered logit.
As can be seen, most of the control variables have the expected sign. Credit rating signi…cantly increases with per capita GDP, with higher population (in log), with current account surplus, with years in o¢ ce and with (absence of) political risk, while it decreases with higher public debt and higher in ‡ation. The coe¢ cients of GDP real growth and reserves to imports are not signi…cant at conventional levels. Among the credit agencies, I observe a higher downward bias for the ratings provided by Standard and Poor's.
Looking at our interest variables, in column 4 of table 6, I …nd that the evidence of a correlation between credit ratings and the simple event of a private haircut becomes actually much weaker than in the growth speci…cation. The only coe¢ cient which is strongly signi…cant, at one-percent levels, and with a negative sign, is that of the anticipated event of a private haircut, which is associated with a reduction of about 3 notches in a country's credit (independently of the haircut size). 36 As the amount of the haircut is concerned, the coe¢ cients of the di¤erent lags are always negative but rarely signi…cant. After four-…ve years since the restructuring, however, while the simple occurrence of a private haircut is not signi…cant, the coe¢ cient of the haircut is negative and signi…cant, at …ve-percent level. In particular, an increase of one standard deviation in the haircut size is associated with a drop of about 0.2 notch in a country's credit ratings. Figure 5 summarizes the results by showing the evolution over time of the size, sign and signi…cance of the coe¢ cients of both the private haircut dummy and size.
Similarly to the case of growth, the haircut size seems to involve some reputational costs and correlation between private haircut and credit rating is negative in the medium run (i.e., up to …ve years after the restructuring episode). These results are similar to those of Cruces and Trebesch (2013a). As they do, by controlling for both the occurrence and the magnitude of sovereign default I am able to detect a more lasting (and negative) link between debt default and borrowing costs.
Even if the comparison between the two sets of results should be taken cautiously given that both the sample size and year period do not coincide, my results are, at least to some extent, consistent with the hypothesis that at least one of the channels explaining the growth pattern over the long period may depend on the perceptions of private investors in the credit market. In fact, the characteristics of the deal (the size of the haircut) seem to be persistent: higher haircuts are still associated to higher ratings up to …ve years after the default. Therefore, the results con…rm that the reputational costs of higher haircuts outweigh their bene…ts in term of debt reduction, as in the case of growth. 
O¢ cial Restructuring
The results for o¢ cial restructurings are presented in table 6. In columns 4-6, I report only the coe¢ cients of the o¢ cial restructuring dummy, the amount of o¢ cial restructuring and of both variables together, in the year of the restructuring, one year before and one year after the default episode, without, and including control variables. In columns 7-8, I
progressively add the coe¢ cients of both the o¢ cial restructuring dummies and size (from three to up to six and seven years after the default) to the speci…cation of column 6. As before, I largely base the discussion on the fully speci…ed model of column 8. 37 As can be seen, most of the control variables have the expected sign. Credit rating signi…cantly increases with per capita GDP, with higher population (in log), with current account surplus and with (absence of) political risk, while it decreases with higher public debt and higher in ‡ation. The coe¢ cients of GDP real growth, years in o¢ ce and reserves to imports are not signi…cant at conventional levels.
Looking at my variables of interest, the coe¢ cients of the o¢ cial restructuring dummy are generally negative and turning positive only in the last period (i.e., after six-seven years since the restructuring episode). More speci…cally, the simple occurrence of an o¢ cial restructuring is negatively correlated with credit rating since one year before up to …ve years after the default episode. Regarding the quantitative impact of our variables of interest, the anticipated event of an o¢ cial restructuring is associated with a drop of about 0.8 notch in a country's credit ratings, while after four-…ve years since the restructuring this drop reduces to 0.33 (independently of the haircut size).
As the size of o¢ cial restructuring is concerned, the coe¢ cients of all lags are generally negative but not always signi…cant. Seven year after the default, however, while the simple occurrence of the restructuring episode has a positive and signi…cant, at …ve-percent level, coe¢ cient, the coe¢ cient of the actual amount of the restructruring is negative and signi…cant, at …ve-percent level. Speci…cally, an increase of one standard deviation in the haircut size is associated with a drop of about 0.15 notch in a country's credit ratings. Figure 6 shows the evolution over time of the size, sign and signi…cance of the o¢ cial restructuring coe¢ cients.
FIGURES 6 HERE
In summary, in the credit rating speci…cation, the results between private haircut and o¢ cial restructuring are overall quite similar, as opposed to the case of growth. Correlation between o¢ cial restructuring and credit rating is negative up to six-seven years after the restructuring episode, and the size of the o¢ cial restructuring seems to involve some reputational costs. These results are again very similar to those of Cruces and Trebesch (2013a).
Contrary to the case of private haircuts, however, the results of o¢ cial restructuring are not consistent with the hypothesis that the perceptions of private investors in the credit market is correlated with the growth pattern over the long period. Thus, the positive relationship between o¢ cial restructuring and economic growth must depend on alternative channels than the credit rating. Put di¤erently, a penalized access to the credit market does not seem to negatively a¤ect the growth prospects of o¢ cial defaulters.
Conclusions
This paper studies the relationship between debt default and GDP growth, over a period of ten years, by taking into account the depth of a debt restructuring and by distinguishing between commercial and o¢ cial sovereign debt restructuring. More speci…cally, the amount of restructured debt is used as a proxy of the severity of the default episode. Moreover, controlling for the severity of the default, I …nd that while the simple occurrence of a (commercial debt) default is generally associated with an increase in economic growth, the amount which is actually restructured (the private haircut) carries a negative stigma up to nine years after the default, somehow hampering recovery. For o¢ cial debt restructuring, the simple event of a restructuring seems not to be related to growth, while the magnitude of the event (the amount of o¢ cial restructurings) is indeed associated to an improvement in the growth prospect up to eight years after the default.
More generally, by controlling for both the occurrence and the magnitude of sovereign debt defaults, I am able to detect a more lasting and negative link between debt default and growth. For private haircuts, occurrence and magnitude goes into opposite direction and high haircuts seem to imply a negative stigma lowering growth over a longer period.
Alternatively, higher amount of o¢ cial restructuring may have some costs in the shortrun, but they do have some positive e¤ects over the long run, as the debt relief e¤ect of high restructurings seems to improve recovery. In this case, no stigma is associated to the size of the restructuring, indeed defaulters seem to bene…t from the debt relief e¤ect of high restructurings (as in Arslanalp and Henry, 2005) , which somehow soften the negative consequences of an o¢ cial default.
Therefore, while more severe private haircuts seem more costly for private defaulters, the opposite holds for o¢ cial restructuring. The trade-o¤ concerning the amount of a sovereign debt restructuring provides opposite outcomes for private and o¢ cial defaulters.
Taken together, the results point to con…rm that o¢ cial and private default may have di¤erent e¤ects and should then be treated di¤erently. If defaulting on private or o¢ cial debt is not the same, this could be particularly instructive, for example, in the case of Greece, where private debt has been replaced by o¢ cial debt.
Adopting an alternative speci…cation, in which the dependent variable is a country's credit rating, I investigate whether one of the channels of the relationship between restructuring and growth may depend on the borrowing conditions (which highly correlate with credit ratings). In this case, however, I …nd very similar results for both private and o¢ cial restructuring.
In the case of private haircuts, my results con…rm higher haircuts are associated to lower ratings up to …ve years after the default (as well as higher haircuts negatively correlates with growth over a long period). The same also holds in the case of o¢ cial debt for which higher restructurings are associated to lower ratings up to seven years after the default.
Hence, in the case of credit ratings, I do not …nd any di¤erence between o¢ cial and private defaulters. To the extent that credit ratings is a good proxy for borrowing costs, this evidence implies that positive growth prospects for o¢ cial defaulters are not a¤ected by a lower reputation in the credit markets but they should be explained by alternative factors.
The analysis is of course limited in several respects. I do not claim to draw causal inferences from the empirical analysis, given the nature of the data available. I do emphasize that the direction of causality in the relationship between sovereign defaults and growth raises some questions and thus a robust association between debt defaults and low growth can only be indicative of a correlation between the two variables. We could observe punishment e¤ects, reputational e¤ects or none of the two. Lower growth might not be the consequence of a default per se but of other factors a¤ecting debt sustainability as well. Therefore, both the determinants and the e¤ects of a debt restructuring should be more carefully investigated. Furthermore, I also plan to check the robustness of the results by exploring the di¤erences between di¤erent degrees of "concessionality" in the new debt contract (Trebesch and Reinarth 2015) and the di¤erences between more "excusable vs. unexcusable" types of defaults (Grossman and Van Huyck 1988) . I leave these questions for future research. Note: Since there is only one case of an official restructuring equal to 326 percent of GDP (Liberia 2010), in Figure 2 this value was dropped. In columns 1-3, the interest variable is the haircut, in columns 4-6 it is official restructuring. t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns 1-3 the dependent variable is the haircut, in columns 4-6 it is official restructuring. t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
